Bond ETFs and other passive bond investment funds provide predictable demand for corporate bonds included in popular bond indices. By issuing index-eligible bonds, firms can take advantage of this passive demand, securing lower spreads and improving other bond contract terms unrelated to index eligibility. Consistent with this prediction, we find that higher passive demand increases firms' propensity to issue bonds, and results in larger bonds with lower spreads, longer maturities, and fewer covenants. Firms issue a disproportional number of bonds with face value just sufficient to be included in popular bond indices. Following an increase in the index size threshold, some firms withdraw from the bond market while others respond by issuing larger bonds.
Introduction
Recent decades have seen a dramatic shift towards low-cost passive investment strategies. Exchangetraded funds (ETFs) and other passive investment vehicles typically track various market indices and do not attempt to identify potentially mispriced securities. The trend towards passive index tracking has affected not only equity markets but also the corporate bond market, where bond ETFs and passive bond funds have attracted significant interest from investors. The inflow of money into such funds now provides predictable demand for corporate bonds as long as they meet certain criteria (such as the minimum issue size) that make them eligible for automatic inclusion in popular corporate bond indices. This passive demand from index trackers may be insensitive to bond yields, covenant protection, and other bond characteristics unrelated to index eligibility. This paper looks at how passive demand affects corporate bond issuance and capital structure. Our results can be summarized as follows. Firms take advantage of passive demand by issuing index-eligible bonds with favorable characteristics. Specifically, we show that higher demand from passive bond index trackers increases firms' propensity to issue bonds, and is associated with larger bond issues, lower yield spreads, fewer covenants, and longer maturities. Bond features undesirable for investors but irrelevant for index inclusion become more prevalent as passive demand for index-eligible bonds increases.
These findings are consistent with a model in which, in addition to active investors who make lending decisions based on their evaluation of expected default losses, there is also a number of passive investors, who invest in all bonds eligible for an index inclusions. In the model, higher passive demand results in larger issue sizes, lower spreads, and higher investment. The effect is predicted to be particularly pronounced for firms that would normally choose to issue bonds with a face value somewhat below the threshold size required for indexing. In the presence of passive demand, such firms may decide to increase the bond issue size just enough to meet the index threshold requirement. By doing so, they can ensure the participation of passive investors, which allows them to issue bonds on better terms and reduce their cost of capital. Consistent with this prediction, we find that firms issue a disproportionate number of bonds that just meet the criteria for inclusion into popular indices tracked by passive bond funds.
Specifically, bond issuance clusters at the minimum index size threshold, and while slightly larger bonds are not uncommon, slightly smaller ones have become exceedingly rare with the rise of passive bond index tracking.
To establish a causal link between passive demand and bond issuance, we look at the effects of changes in the bond index eligibility requirements. We find that when index providers raise the minimum bond size required for index inclusion, firms respond by issuing larger bonds and clustering at the new, higher threshold. The effect is particularly pronounced for those firms which, absent the change, would be likely to issue a bond slightly below the new threshold. At the same time, we show that an increase in the index threshold temporarily reduces firms' propensity to issue bonds. Put differently, rather than issuing a bond large enough to be eligible for indexing under the new rules, or selling a smaller bond that cannot take advantage of passive demand, some firms react to the tightening of index rules by abstaining from bond issuance altogether.
Taken together, our findings suggest that passive demand for corporate bonds affects firms' debt financing decisions, bond contract terms, and the cost of capital. It incentivizes firms to issue larger bonds than they would otherwise, while simultaneously allowing them to pay lower spreads and secure more favorable bond terms along the dimensions irrelevant for index inclusion. In our model, this behavior has real consequences, as firms take advantage of the availability of cheap bond financing to increase investment. 1 Our paper is the first to explore corporate finance implications of the rise of passive investment strategies in the corporate bond market. A number of papers have studied the effects 'nonfundamental 1 Although a study of the real effects of passive bond demand is beyond the scope of this paper, we would nonetheless expect that in reality looser bond terms should result in a relaxation of constraints on investment. For example, covenants have been shown to constrain investment (Chava and Roberts (2008) ). Thus, by allowing firms to issue bonds with fewer covenants, passive bond demand may have real effects.
investor demand' (Graham and Leary, 2011) on firms' capital structure decisions. 2 We contribute to this literature by showing how the presence of passive bond investors affects firms' debt policy. A sizable literature explores various implications of the secular shift toward passive investment strategies, indexing, and ETFs, including its effect on market efficiency (Stambaugh (2014) , Wurgler (2011) ), market fragility and volatility (Ben-David et al., 2018) , underlying correlations (Da and Shive, 2017) , corporate governance (Appel et al., 2016) , and corporate investment (Massa et al., 2005) . These studies have focused on the passive demand in public equity markets, whereas we look at the demand for corporate bonds. What makes bond decisions particularly interesting to explore in this context is that, compared with equities, firms can adjust many different bond features, some of which determine the bond's elegibility for indexing, and some are important for the firm but not for the passive bond funds' decision to invest.
Only a few papers have studied the effects of corporate bonds' inclusion in tracked bond indices. Dannhauser (2017) examines the effects of ETF ownership on bond yields by looking at changes to Markit iBoxx bond indices rules. Dick-Nielsen and Rossi (2017) estimate the cost of liquidity in corporate bonds using index exclusions as a laboratory. Chen et al. (2014) look at a change in rating calculations by the Lehman Brothers bond indices (now the Bloomberg Barclays indices) and the effect on bond yields. All of these papers look at bonds that are already outstanding when index rules change. By contrast, we focus on the corporate finance implications of passive demand, investigating its effect on firms' decisions to issue bonds and on the resulting bond characteristics in the new issuance market.
Model and testable hypotheses
In this section we show how the structure of investors' demand for bonds may affect firms' issuance decisions. We distinguish between 'active' bond investors, who decide whether or not to buy a bond based on their evaluation of expected default losses, and 'passive' investors, who invest in each bond regardless of its characteristics as long as the bond's face value is large enough for it to be included in a tracked index. We use the following simple model to flush out the intuition and guide our empirical tests.
Model setup and the demand for bonds
A firm is considering raising funds in the corporate bond market for one period, and needs to choose the size of the bond to issue. The risk-free interest rate is zero, so that the bond interest rate coincides with the bond spread. For reasons described in the next paragraph, in order to sell a bigger bond the firm needs to pay investors a higher spread; in other words, it faces an upward-sloping demand for bonds in the bond size/spread space. All bond characteristics other than size and spread are pre-determined and fixed. Denote by s(D) the inverse bond demand function, i.e., spread at which investors will agree to purchase a bond with a face value of D, given the firm's credit risk and other relevant parameters. The upward-sloping bond demand schedule arises as follows. There is a continuum of active bond investors, each of which can invest one dollar in the firm's bond, who differ in their assessment of the (risk-neutral) expected loss from default. Given the firm's and bond's characteristics, an active investor invests in the bond if his or her estimate of the loss from default is below the offered bond spread. Denote by F (s) the number of active investors whose estimate of the risk-neutral expected loss is below s; we assume that F is monotonically increasing. Thus, if the firm wants to issue a bond with the face value D and there are only active bond investors present, the lowest spread that will allow it to sell the whole issue can be found from F (s) = D, giving rise to an increasing inverse demand function s(D) = F −1 (D).
Intuitively, when faced with active investors with heterogeneous beliefs, in order to sell a large bond the firm needs to attract many pessimistic investors, who require higher bond spreads to offset their default expectations.
Assume that the emergence of passive bond funds means that in addition to the active investors, there are now also P passive investors, who will buy the firm's bond regardless of the spread, provided that the issue is of sufficient size to make it eligible for an index inclusion. Denote the size threshold for index eligibility asD. Thus, if D >D, passive investors will invest P dollars in the bond at any spread. 4
The resulting demand schedule is illustrated in Figure 1 . Small issues (D <D) must be sold to active investors at the spread given by s = F −1 (D). By contrast, for large, index-eligible issues (D ≥D) passive investors automatically contribute P dollars, leaving only D − P to be financed by active investors. This allows the firm to sell the bond at the reduced spread given by s(D) = F −1 (D − P ).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Model predictions
The firm chooses the size of the bond, D, that maximizes its profit from investment net of debt costs, taking into account that the required bond spread is given by the demand curve shown in Figure 1 . To flush out the intuition, it is convenient to distinguish between cases when the firm's optimal issue size in the absence of passive demand would be much smaller thanD, 'slightly' smaller thanD, or larger than D. We refer to these cases as small, medium, and large target issue size cases. For small target issues (D D ), passive demand is likely to be irrelevant for the firm's decision, and only active investors' demand needs to be considered. However, for medium and large issues the presence of passive investors will in general result in larger issues and lower spreads. Figure 2a illustrates the firm's decision when the target issue size is large. In the absence of passive 4 Without loss of generality, we assume that P <D.
demand, the firm's optimal choice is given by point A, which results in the highest feasible profit given the demand curve for bonds. 5 The presence of passive investors shifts the optimal choice to point B,
at which the size of the issue is larger while the yield spread is lower. This result is rather general: It is straightforward to show that for large issue sizes, under reasonable parameterizations of the relevant functions the optimal issue size is increasing in the amount of passive demand, P , and the equilibrium spread is decreasing in it. Moreover, passive demand also increases the firm's propensity to issue bonds.
Indeed, profits are strictly higher at point B than at A. Thus, there exists a range of parameters under which the cost of accessing the bond market, c, deter bond issuance at point A, but not at point B.
Figure 2b demonstrates that for firms with a medium target bond size (i.e., those which in the absence of passive investors would choose the bond size slightly belowD), the introduction of passive investors may result in a corner solution, with the bond size exactly equal toD. In the graph, with active investors only the firm would choose point A below the index threshold. But given the passive demand of P , the firm's profits are maximized at point B, i.e., at the issue sizeD just sufficient to make the bond eligible for indexing. Thus, for a range of target issue sizes just below the index threshold, passive demand may induce firms to bump their bond size to coincide with the threshold. While this size is somewhat larger than ideal for these firms, the fact that allows them to access the passive demand makes this choice worthwhile. Empirically, we should expect to see a disproportional number of issues concentrating at the index threshold, and few issues just below the threshold.
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] Now suppose that the index provider decides to increase the threshold size for index inclusion from D toD . This situation is depicted in Figure 3 . Upon the threshold increase, a range of previously feasible size-spread combinations becomes unavailable. Specifically, firms that under the old threshold would optimally choose bond sizes betweenD andD will no longer be able to do that while paying the 5 The firm's indifference curves are plotted assuming a square-root production function (f = √ D) and linear demand for bonds from active investors. same spreads as before, because bonds of this size are no longer bought by passive investors. As a result, these firms may decide to increase the bond size, decrease it, or abstain from bond issuance.
Consider the case depicted in Figure 3a . With point A no longer attainable, the firm may choose to switch to point B (the new corner solution) and issue the bond at the new threshold size,D . Thus, following the threshold increase, firms with target issue sizes slightly belowD will cluster their issuance at this new threshold. However, because point B corresponds to lower expected profits 6 , for high enough costs of bond issuance the firm may decide not to issue the bond at all and forgo the investment.
It is also possible that, rather than inflating the bond size to meet the new threshold, the new optimal choice for the firm would be to issue a smaller bond, relying only on active investors' demand. Consider the case illustrated in Figure 3b . As point A becomes unavailable, the firm's profits are maximized at point C, where it sells the bond to active investors only instead of inflating its size to meet the new indexing threshold.
Which of these two outcomes prevails depends on how big the threshold increase is relative to passive investment P . By continuity, when point A in Figure 3a is sufficiently close to point B, reaching for the new threshold will be optimal. But in general there may or may not be a region in which the bond will be sold to active investors only, as in Figure 3b . However, in both cases firms' profits are unambiguously lower than at point A before the change. Thus, the model implies that firms' willingness to issue bonds declines when the index threshold increases.
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] To summarize, the model predicts that firms' propensity to issue bonds is positively correlated with passive demand, and decreases when the bond index provider raises the threshold size for index inclusion.
Conditional on issuance, the bond size is increasing and the spread is decreasing in the amount of passive demand. Bond issuance by firms with medium target bond sizes clusters at the index threshold, with few issues just below it. When the threshold increases, firms with target bond sizes slightly below the new threshold issue larger bonds, sufficient to meet the new requirement for inclusion.
It should be noted that the above discussion assumes that all bond and firms characteristics other than the bond size and spread are held constant. In reality, all bond characteristics are determined jointly, including covenants, maturity, seniority, etc. An increase in the passive demand expands the set of feasible contracts in the firm's favor, because passive investors buy eligible bonds regardless of their creditor-unfriendly features. This, however, does not imply that all bond features will necessarily be adjusted in the firm's favor. For example, in the presence of passive demand a firm that finds covenants very cost may choose a new bond contract with less covenant protection, even if such a bond can only be sold at a higher spread. Theoretically, when the choice of multiple bond characteristics is modeled jointly, the resulting equilibrium will depend on the relationship between these characteristics and expected default losses, as well as on how costly the unfavorable bond terms (such as strict covenants or short bond maturities) are for the firm. Thus, with multiple choice variables the equilibrium effect is an empirical question, one that we address below.
Data description
In this section, we detail the data used in our analysis as well as the definitions of key variables. All variables are listed and explained in Appendix 1.
Passive bond investment
We use the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database from January 1990 to September 2017 to measure passive investment in corporate bonds. We are interested in funds that (i) invest at least part of their assets in U.S. corporate bonds and (ii) passively follow an index. For all funds with "Bond" and either "ETF", "Exchange Traded", "Exchange-Traded", or "Index" in the name, we manually identified which index they follow. After removing funds that invest only in government or bonds, in municipal bonds, in non-U.S. corporate bonds, or are actively managed, we are left with 277 passive bond funds tracking 104 bond indices.
Since many funds track indices with more than just U.S. corporate bonds, we adjust the amount of net assets invested in a fund by the percentage of the index invested in corporate bonds. We track the time series of the FISD universe (including amount outstanding, ratings and coupon status, as well as non-time varying characteristics) and estimate the total face value of all bonds that meet an index's criteria, and calculate the corporate bond percentage as corporate bond face value divided by total face value. 7 Figure 4 shows the total net assets invested in U.S. corporate bonds. Figure 5a shows that more than 80% of passive funds invested in investment grade corporate bonds follow indices run by Bloomberg 9 Figure 5b shows that there is a little more variation in high yield bond funds; approximately 50% of funds follow Markit iBoxx indices and 40% follow Bloomberg indices.
[ INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] As discussed in our model framework, our empirical tests require a measure of passive demand for a given bond. We empirically proxy for this using passive demand perc, which measures the estimated 7 FISD does not track the securitized bond market, so we adjust the corporate bond percentage down in the case of aggregate bond market indices. The adjustment factor is based on relative face value of the BAML Broad Market Index and BAML U.S. Corporate and Government Index.
8 As of the end of our sample period, there is an additional $517 billion invested in bonds outside of the scope of this paper, such as government, agency and securitized bonds, and non-U.S. corporate bonds.
9 Bloomberg bond indices were run by Barclays until August 2016 and by Lehman Brothers until November 2008.
proportion of the corporate bond market held by passive investment funds. We calculate it as the total net assets invested in U.S. corporate bonds, separated into investment grade and high yield buckets, divided by the size of the relevant bond universe. The investment grade and high yield corporate bond universes are approximated using the total face value of the Bloomberg U.S. Corporate Index and Bloomberg U.S.
HY Corporate Bond Index, respectively. Figure 6 shows the calculation of this variable over our sample period. As of September 2017, we estimate that more than 5% of investment grade bond face value and more than 3% of high yield bond face value is held by passive funds.
[ INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] It should be noted that unlike equity index funds, bond index funds do not necessarily replicate the index they track. For example, according to its prospectus, the Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund "invests by sampling the Index, meaning that is holds a broadly diversified collection of securities that, in the aggregate, approximates the full Index in terms of key risk factors and other characteristics. All of the Fund's investments will be selected through the sampling process, and at least 80% of the Fund's assets will be invested in bonds held in the Index" (Vanguard, 2017).
Index inclusion
In order to identify the causal effect of passive demand on corporate bond issuance, we examine changes to the index inclusion rules over time. As discussed previously, we focus on the index providers with the largest amount of passive following, Bloomberg (IG and HY) and Markit iBoxx (HY). We focus on changes to the minimum face value for inclusion, which has a potential direct impact on a firm's capital structure (amount of leverage). Appendix 2 has a more fulsome discussion of the rule changes.
Because index inclusion rules are different for investment grade and high yield bonds, we assign each bond to either the investment grade or high yield pool based on its initial rating and the rating criteria at the time of issuance. We do not classify bonds that do not have an initial rating.
Based on the offering date of a bond and the relevant index, we calculate a variable measuring the difference between the offering amount and the index threshold, dist to threshold. A negative value for dist to threshold means the issue is too small to qualify for the index, while a zero or positive value means the issue meets the size criteria.
Corporate bond issuance
For new issuance of corporate bonds, we use Mergent's Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). We eliminate issuance by government, financial and utility issuers; issuers not domiciled in the United States;
bonds not denominated in USD; duplicate bonds 10 ; convertible debentures, floating rate bonds, preferred shares and bonds issued as a part of a unit deal; and issuance less than $25 million. The final sample includes 16,858 bonds issued between January 1990 and September 2017.
Our key variables of interest include the log of the offering amount, the credit spread at issuance, the level of covenant protection, and the initial maturity, all taken from FISD. 11 We estimate the strength of the covenant protection using a version of Moody's Covenant Quality Index. We include market level variables, such as the 10-year Treasury bond rate, the term slope and the spread between Baa and Aaa bonds, which we get from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis.
In order to include financial controls in our analysis, we match FISD to Compustat and CRSP using issuer-level CUSIPs where possible, and by firm name otherwise. 12 Where available, we include firmlevel financial data from Compustat (from the quarter before issuance), and annualized daily volatility from CRSP. We winsorize all ratios and volatility at the 1% and 99% levels. Panel A of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the sample of bond issuers.
10 For example, a registered bond that was originally issued as a Rule 144A bond would include two entries in FISD; we keep the original 144A bond in the sample but eliminate the bond into which it exchanges.
11 FISD has covenant data for 10,276 bonds in our sample. 12 We are able to match approximately three quarters of our sample to Compustat.
Full Compustat sample
In order to examine the effects of passive demand on the propensity to access the bond market, we examine the universe of U.S. Compustat firms excluding financial and utility firms (sic codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999, respectively). There are 16,267 unique firms and 652,027 firm-quarters between September 1989
and June 2017 (lagged one quarter from the issuance sample).
Using the links between FISD agent id and Compustat gvkey, we calculate a dummy variable issuer which takes on a value of 1 in a firm-quarter if the firm in the next quarter issues a bond meeting the criteria in the previous section. For firms that issue more than one bond in a quarter, we calculate the average bond size and use the log of that amount in our analysis.
For firm-quarters with at least one rated bond outstanding, we are able to classify an observation as either investment grade or not. In order to estimate whether a non-rated issuer is investment grade or not, we regress the FISD investment grade dummy on the components of the Z-score and calculating the linear prediction from the fitted model. We then identify a cutoff prediction value that correctly classifies the highest number of firms as investment grade or not.
We winsorize all variables calculated as ratios at the 1% and 99% levels. Panel B of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the full Compustat universe.
Empirical results
In this section, we test the hypotheses explored in section 1.
Passive investment and bond characteristics
Our first hypothesis is that as passive demand increases, we expect bonds to be larger (either as firms 'reach' to be included in the index as in Figure 2b or simply take advantage of additional demand as in Figure 2a ) and spreads should decrease. In addition, if firms are able to take advantage of passive money, they may also try and issue bonds with more firm-friendly features, such as fewer covenants or longer maturity. We test this hypothesis in the following specification:
where bondchar it for bond i at time t is either the bond size (logamt), the spread (spread), the level of covenants (cov score) or initial time to maturity (initmat). We expect the coefficient β will be positive for logamt and initmat (larger and longer bonds) and negative for spread and cov score (less expensive and fewer limits).
Our dependent variable of interest, passive demand perc t , is the same across all bonds issued in a given month. Across all specifications, we include quarter fixed effects and industry fixed effects. 13 We run five different specifications in terms of controls: no additional controls; control for bond rating;
control for bond rating, log assets and leverage; controls for bond rating, log assets, leverage and other firm and market variables we believe to be important; and bond rating, log assets, leverage and the variables identified in Graham and Leary (2011) (excluding R&D to sales as we lose more than half of our sample by including it). Coefficients on controls are not shown for brevity. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 2.   [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] Consistent with our hypothesis, across all specifications we see that passive demand is significantly correlated with larger and less expensive bonds (Panels A and B, respectively). The results on covenant strictness and initial maturity (Panels C and D, respectively) are not significant across all specifications, but the coefficients move in the expected direction. Table 2 presents suggestive evidence that benefit from increasing passive demand in the bond market -issued bonds are larger, less expensive, and have more firm-friendly qualitative features. In order to
13 Though we would like to use 2-digit SIC for all industry fixed effects, this requires a link to Compustat as FISD does not provide SIC. For specifications that use only FISD data, we instead use FISD's industry code, which is as coarse as 1-digit SIC. In untabulated results, we rerun all specifications using 2-digit SIC and results are qualitatively similar. establish a causal relationship between passive demand and bond characteristics, we focus on bond size in particular.
Index inclusion thresholds
In order to help us assess whether firm decisions are affected by passive demand, we first try to establish that firms care about being included in important indices. Since issuing a security that meets index criteria greatly increases the chances that passive funds will buy a bond, we examine if firms issue bonds that meet index eligibility criteria.
All indices that are tracked by passive funds have many criteria for inclusion, such as credit quality, minimum face value, required features (e.g. fixed coupon) or forbidden features (e.g. warrants). We focus on index threshold for minimum face value as it is directly chosen by the issuer (as opposed to credit quality for example) and there is large variation in the bond sizes that are issued by firms, implying that it is a key choice variable. We can compare the size of each bond to this index threshold, which as discussed in Appendix 2, varies between investment grade and high yield indices and is time-varying.
We test the importance of the index thresholds using a test from the regression discontinuity design (RDD) literature: the density test from McCrary (2008) was designed to check for manipulation of a running variable in an RDD. In the case of bond inclusion in an index, we expect to find manipulation around the threshold; since index rules are public knowledge and offering amount is chosen by the issuer, we would not expect to find issuance randomly assigned on both sides of the threshold. We instead expect to see that the density of the distribution higher immediately to the right of the threshold than the left. This is consistent with our model prediction that we observe issuers 'jump' to meet the threshold who would issue a slightly smaller bond in the absence of passive demand.
Using the dist to threshold as the variable of interest, Figure 7 shows that there exists a sharp discontinuity to the left and the right of the threshold line, with higher density to the right of the discontinuity than the left. This is the case for the full sample, the investment grade sample and the high yield sample. 14 [INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE] Because the index thresholds occur at round $50 million increments and bonds are often issued in round amounts, it is not surprising that we find a discontinuity at the threshold. As an alternative, we perform a separate test of the importance of the threshold level to a given bond's size, controlling for observable factors that we believe influence issuance amount. 15 In particular, we run the following regression:
where logthresh t is the log of the threshold for inclusion in relevant index at the time of issuance.
We include quarter and industry fixed effects as well as the same controls as described for Table 2 .
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] Table 3 shows that the β coefficient is significant and positive across all specifications, controlling for important determinants of bond size. In other words, the level of the threshold is positively related to bond sizes above and beyond firm-level factors that likely influence leverage decisions.
We interpret the results in Table 3 as issuers responding to index requirements in order to be exposed to passive demand. However, the reverse interpretation is also possible: index providers observe that bond sizes are increasing and so increase the threshold to track the more relevant part of the market. In order to eliminate this alternative explanation and try to identify a causal relationship between passive 14 Note that we include only bonds with a distance of $500 million or less; this does not effect bonds near the threshold (bonds of interest here) and serves only to make the graphs more focused.
15 This test can be done in a way similar to Dougal et al. (2015) , where the issuance amount is first predicted using observable factors, and the actual amount is regressed on predicted amount and the threshold.
demand and bond sizes, we examine bond issuance in short periods of time before and after changes in the index inclusion rules. The bottom panel shows that in the six months after the effective date of the change, there are very few investment grade issuance at the $250 million level, while there was a healthy amount of issuance at that level in the six months before the change was announced.
[INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE] Figure 9 shows the same analysis for high yield bonds. We examine one change in the Bloomberg U.S.
Corporate HY Index (increase from $100 million to $150 million in 2000) and one change in the Markit iBoxx Liquid High Yield Index (increase from $200 million to $400 million in 2009, along with other changes). Though the change to the Bloomberg index is early in the sample (before passive investment in high yield), there is a clear cluster immediately to the right of the threshold in both graphs. This may be due to the fact that the index was an important benchmark index for active investors. The results are less clear for the change in the Markit iBoxx index, where there is some clustering at both the old and new thresholds before and after the change. We speculate that this may be due to the fact that the threshold increase was extreme and to a level that was not feasible for all high yield issuers.
[ INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE] The results in Figures 8 and 9 visually show that issuance tends to cluster at amounts at or immediately above the index thresholds. In order to formally test the effect of index changes on bond size, we examine bond issuance before and after such changes:
where post it is a dummy that takes on a value of 0 in the period before a change is announced and 1 in the period after the change is implemented (the period in between the announcement and effective date is ignored). As controls, we include log assets, market leverage and rating of the bond, as well as change-by-industry fixed effects. Table 4 shows that, relative to bonds issued in the period immediately before a change, bonds issued immediately after a change are significantly larger.
[ with the exception of a decrease in the 2017 investment grade index threshold increase. Given that we see a sharp increase at the threshold for this change, we believe this is likely due to bonds that are not constrained by the index threshold (i.e. are significantly larger than both the old and the new threshold).
Panel B of Table 4 takes an alternative approach, following our model prediction about where we would expect firms to issue absent a change in the threshold (see Figure 3) . Using only bonds in the pre-change periods, we first predict the offering size of a bond based on the controls above (log assets, leverage and rating, including change-by-industry fixed effects), and place the bond in one of three buckets: predicted bond size that is above the new threshold (column 8), predicted bond size above the old threshold but below the new threshold (column 9), and predicted bond size below both the old and new threshold (column 10). 16 We would expect to find no significance on the coefficient for post in buckets 1 and 3, where the index threshold is not binding and not applicable, respectively. We expect a significantly positive relationship between logamt and post for bucket 2, the group that has to 'reach' to be included in the index in the post-change period but did not have to reach in the pre-change period. As expected, there is no significant relationship for bucket 3, and a significantly positive relationship in bucket 2.
Though we find a significantly positive relationship for bucket 1, the magnitude of the coefficient is much smaller than in bucket 2.
Overall, we believe that this evidence points to the fact that firms pay attention to and respond to index inclusion rules, and strive to meet index criteria and be exposed to predictable demand from passive investment vehicles.
Passive investment and access to bond markets
While the previous section analyzed the effects of passive demand on bond characteristics conditional on bond issuance, our model also predicts that passive demand will have a positive impact on firms' ability or willingness to access the bond market. In order to explore this, we look the panel of Compustat firms and estimate the following linear probability model:
where issuer it is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 in quarters that a firm accesses the bond market, and 0 otherwise. We include quarter fixed effects across all specifications, and either 2-digit SIC or firm fixed effects. In terms of other controls, we either include: log assets, leverage, and a dummy that estimates investment grade status; log assets, leverage, and the components of the z-score; or the variables included in Leary and Roberts (2005) that determine financing decisions. Since we have a panel of firm-quarters, we are able to cluster errors at the firm level. Table 5 shows the results.
[
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Across almost all specifications, the coefficient on passive demand perc t is significantly positive, indicating that investment in passive funds is correlated with firms' increased propensity to access the bond markets.
While the relationship between passive demand and issuance propensity holds over the full sample, we can try and drill down to the short-term effect around index threshold changes, as we examined in the previous section. We replace passive demand perc with the the post variable in the previous regression:
The results of this regression are shown in Table 6 . We include change-by-industry or change-by-firm fixed effects and the same controls as those included in Table 5 .
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] In contrast to the long-term positive relationship, in the short term around index threshold changes, a firm's propensity to access the bond market is actually reduced. Combined with our previous results about firms 'reaching' to be included in the index, this can be interpreted as evidence that firms are somewhat discouraged by being required to issue larger bonds immediately after the index threshold increases.
Passive investment and leverage levels
The natural question that arises from our previous analyses is the net effect on firm leverage, which combines a firm's propensity to issue a bond, and conditional on being an issuer, how much they choose to issue. We first look at an extension of equations (1) and (4):
We include industry and quarter effects in all specifications, as well as the same controls as the analysis in Table 3 (though the coefficients on controls are suppressed for brevity). In order to measure leverage, we look at both market leverage (qlev) and book leverage (lev) ratios.
Based on our previous findings using passive demand perc it (that it is positively related to both bond sizes and propensity), we expect the β coefficient in this regression to be significant and positive. As can be seen in Table 7 , this is not the case in all specifications.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
In general, the relationship between leverage ratios and passive demand is unclear, as it depends on the definition of leverage (market or book) and the specification. There are several factors that will impact this ratio that we do not explicitly examine, such as other firm financing decisions (bank debt, equity issuance, stock repurchases, etc.) and other market impacts such as stock returns.
We can try to get a clearer picture by looking at a shorter time window, such as the short window immediately around index threshold changes that we have examined previously. This is an extension of equations (3) and (5):
However, there is no clear prediction on the β coefficient, since we found opposite effects of the post variable in terms of propensity to issue (negative) and offering size (positive). The net effect on leverage will ultimately depend on which effect dominates.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] Across most specifications, the relationship between the post variable and leverage ratios is either significantly negative or insignificant. While the relationship is still not entirely clear, it appears that the crowding out effect of reduced issuance is stronger than the effect of larger issuance sizes for the subset of firms that do issue in the post-change period.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effects of passive investment on firms' activity in the primary bond market.
Investment in passive bond mutual funds and ETFs has increased drastically in the last decade, and many investment vehicles track a small number of bond indices that have well-known eligibility criteria.
We show that, in order to be exposed to passive investment funds, firms issue bonds that comply along dimensions that are relevant for eligibility criteria, such as bond size, with clustering at index thresholds.
Higher passive demand increases firms' propensity to issue bonds in general, and firms are able to take advantage by improving bond terms that are irrelevant to index inclusion (but still important to bond investors), such as lower spreads, fewer covenants, and longer maturities. These results are consistent with a model in which passive investors will buy bonds which meet index criteria, reducing the relative amount of active investors needed to fund a given bond amount.
We establish a causal link between passive demand and bond issuance by examining activity in short windows around changes to eligibility criteria for popular bond indices. After an increase to the index threshold, firms' propensity to issue a bond is temporarily decreased, though firms that do access the market issue larger bonds that meet the new higher criteria. It appears that most firms choose either to issue bonds that meet index eligibility criteria or not issue all, so increases to size thresholds result electing the latter option as the former becomes non-optimal.
We have explored the impact of passive demand on bond issuance, an important financial activity, contributing to the literature on effects of the secular trend towards passive investment. An interesting extension would be the effect on real activities, such as firm investment. We speculate that increased passive investment facilitates access to financing and thus investment, though this may be temporarily disrupted for some firms, as shown by our results around index threshold changes. The differential impact among firms and over time is a potentially interesting area of research. Table 2 Regressions of bond characteristics on percentage of bond index value held by passive funds. All regressions include quarter fixed effects; regressions in first two columns include industry fixed effects measured by FISD industry code and regressions in last three columns include industry fixed effects measured by 2-digit SIC code. First column: no additional controls. Second column: controls for avgrating. Third column: controls for avgrating, logassets and qlev. Fourth column: controls for avgrating, logassets, qlev, volatility, profitability, q, tangibility, tax, y10, termslope, and baa aaa spread. Fifth column: controls for avgrating, logassets, qlev, age, profitability ni, maba, z score, earningsvol, tangibility and tax. Coefficients on controls are not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table 3 Regressions of log offering size on the log of the threshold for a bond to be included in an index. All regressions include quarter fixed effects; regressions in first column includes industry fixed effects measured by FISD industry code and regressions in last three columns include industry fixed effects measured by 2-digit SIC code. First column: controls for avgrating. Second column: controls for avgrating, logassets and qlev. Third column: controls for avgrating, logassets, qlev, volatility, profitability, q, tangibility, tax, y10, termslope, and baa aaa spread. Fourth column: controls for avgrating, logassets, qlev, age, profitability ni, maba, z score, earningsvol, tangibility and tax. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Passive Demand

Spread
(1) Table 4 Regressions of log offering size on post, which takes a value of 0 in the 12 months before an index change is announced and a value of 1 in the 12 months after the change is effective. Panel A examines the effect in all changes (first column) with change-by-industry fixed effects or by change with industry only fixed effects. Panel B uses predicted offering amounts and classifies issuers in one of three buckets: predicted amount above the new threshold (column 8), predicted amount above the old threshold but below the new threshold (column 9), and predicted amount before the old threshold (column 10). Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table 5 Regressions of issuer dummy on percentage of bond index value held by passive funds. All regressions include quarter fixed effects; regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) include industry fixed effects while regressions in columns (2), (4) and (6) include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) Table 6 Regressions of issuer dummy on post, which takes a value of 0 in the 12 months before an index change is announced and a value of 1 in the 12 months after the change is effective. Regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) include change-by-industry fixed effects while regressions in columns (2), (4) and (6) include change-by-firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) Table 7 Regressions of leverage ratios on post, which takes a value of 0 in the 12 months before an index change is announced and a value of 1 in the 12 months after the change is effective. Panel A uses as the dependent variable market leverage (qlev) while panel B uses book leverage (lev). Regressions in columns (1), (3) and (5) include change-by-industry fixed effects while regressions in columns (2), (4) and (6) include change-by-firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All specifications include the controls in Table 3 (coefficients on controls not shown). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (1), (3) and (5) include industry fixed effects while regressions in columns (2), (4) and (6) include firm fixed effects. All specifications include the controls in Table 3 (coefficients on controls not shown). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Covenants are classified into each bucket and the bond receives a category score equal to the number of covenants included divided by the total number of covenants in the category. Examples of each category: "restricted payments" for RP, "investments" for RI, "indebtedness" for DEBT, "negative pledge covenant" for LIEN, "fixed charge coverage" for SS, and "change control put provisions" for COC. Dummy that takes on a value of 0 for the period 15 months to 3 months before an index threshold change and a value of 1 for the 12 months after the change.
Bloomberg (IG) and iBoxx (HY)
Controls avgrating Simple average of the initial ratings assigned to the bond by Moody's, Fitch and Standard & Poor's (converted to a common inverted numerical scale). If a particular bond does not have an initial rating that meets this criterion, the initial rating is assumed to be the same as the issuer's most recent rating.
FISD ig
Dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the avgrating is less than or equal to 10 (corresponds to BBB-/Baa3).
FISD ig est
Dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is estimated to be investment grade and 0 otherwise. Investment grade estimation is done by regressing investment grade status for rated firms on wc2ta, re2ta, ebit2ta, me2tl and s2ta, predicting the value for all firms and assigning a cutoff value that correctly classifies the highest percentage of rated observations. Compustat z score z score = 1.2 * wc2ta + 1.4 * re2ta + 3.3 * ebit2ta + 0.6 * me2tl + 0.999 * s2ta. Calcualted using raw values; result winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Compustat and FISD
Compustat wc2ta Current assets less current liability, divided by total assets. When used as a direct variable, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Compustat re2ta
Retained earnings divided by total assets. When used as a direct variable, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
